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1. Introduction
In this paper I investigate the tradition 
of “philosophy” and “philosopher” with 
respect to their importance in Christian-
ity. I argue that the meaning of the tradi-
tional notion of philosophy as an abstract 
science has importantly changed. The rea-
son for this is that the “cosmo-theological” 
character of traditional philosophy proved 
to be untenable. If this pattern is not valid 
in our days, then the question arises if the 
role of philosophy, as conceived during the 
Christian centuries, can be continued in 
and beyond our age. My answer has two 
aspects: on the one hand, the cosmo-the-
ological character of philosophy needs to 
be explored or “demythologized;” on the 
other hand, Christian thought still has the 
potential to open itself to a future renewal. 
Thinking philosophically is a fundamental 
human feature, and I suggest that “trying to 
become wise,” the striving for the discov-
ery and realization of the meaningfulness 
of reality is still the main concern of hu-
man beings reflecting on their historical existence today. In this sense, the 
encyclical letter of Fides et ratio by John Paul II offers guidance, inasmuch 
as its author calls for “courage” in thinking. Following this call, the present 
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paper contends that the three mains tasks of a Christian philosophy today 
are as follows: 1. A sufficient understanding of the tradition determined by 
cosmo-theology; 2. A sufficient understanding of the importance of the 
trauma of totalitarianism of the twentieth century as the dividing line be-
tween tradition and contemporary reflections; and 3. A sufficient under-
standing of human beings striving to grasp the meaning of personhood in 
an open universe on the basis of the meaningfulness of reality. 
2. What is Philosophy?
If one asks what philosophy is, one faces first of all a linguistic prob-
lem. The word “philosophy” comes from the Greek and its meaning is 
not very clear from the outset. There is a grammatical and semantic dif-
ference between “philosophy” and “philosopher,” because the latter re-
fers to the lover of the “wise one” (sophos), while the former is about 
the lover of “wisdom” (sophia).1 This difference between philosophy and 
philosopher is important, because it shows that the activity of the phi-
losopher, that is “the love for the wise one,” may not be reduced to the 
abstract term of “philosophy.” The activity of the philosopher, according 
to its original setting, is closer to a personal relationship, as the basis of 
community, than to the abstract intellectual procedures of philosophy 
as we tend to understand this term today.
In the most important first documents of Greek philosophy, the writ-
ings of Plato and Aristotle, “wisdom” cannot be detached from “being 
wise” or “the wise one,” because the overall direction of these archaic 
forms of thought is in a sense theistic or, as we would put it with a later 
Greek expression, “metaphysical.” Their theism or metaphysical charac-
ter is relatively indistinct, and this is more so in Plato than in Aristotle. 
However, these authors appear to agree in the point that the philosopher 
1 Pythagoras called himself φιλόσοφος, not σοφός, and here the “philosopher” clearly 
means “the lover of the wise one.” This “wise one” can be understood as identical with divine provi-
dence or divinity itself. See the parallel expressions: φιλόβιβλος, lover of book, φιλόξεινος, lover of 
guest, φιλόδημος, lover of people etc. 
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investigates nature and culture not for the sake of a self-contained ab-
stract science, and not for the sake of technological expertise, but rather 
in the interest of a metaphysical aim. This aim, as both Plato and Aris-
totle seem to agree, is divinization, the exact content of which cannot be 
precisely determined on the basis of their writings.2
On the other hand, these writings contain an encyclopedia of then 
cutting-edge knowledge about so different fields as politics and cosmol-
ogy, morals and civic law, mathematics and logic, biology and geogra-
phy.3 These writers and their followers conceived philosophy not only 
metaphysically but encyclopedically as well. Philosophy, in other words, 
used to be the name of all-encompassing knowledge which tried to syn-
thesize various scientific branches with metaphysics. At the same time, 
as among others Pierre Hadot explained it, the center of philosophy after 
the post-Platonic and Post-Aristotelian periods was a certain way of life, 
2 As Socrates says, “Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of 
the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible; and 
to become like God is to become righteous and holy and wise” (Theaetetus 176 b). And Aristo-
tle: “Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of this kind must evidently 
be the state opposed to the brutish state; for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god 
[…]” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1145 a). “The escape from the earth to the dwelling of the gods” is 
a mythological figure of speech in the framework of cosmo-theology (about which see further 
the main text).
3 In the Republic, Plato offers a list of the sciences: arithmetic, geometry, physical or op-
tical astronomy, mental astronomy, physical harmonics, mental harmonics, and finally dialectics 
(525–532). We can speak of Plato’s ethics and politics (in many parts of the Republic), law (in the 
Laws), literature and music (in the Republic, the Laws and in many other dialogues), anatomy (Ti-
maeus 61 ff.), and geography (Phaedo 109 ff.; Timaeus 22–26; Critias 3). Systematically, the passage 
in the Republic offers a synthetic view in which astronomy, and especially mental astronomy, occu-
pies the second highest place, and dialectics, that is to say the investigation of the hierarchy of the 
sciences on the basis of “conversation” is on the top of all sciences. — Aristotle’s theory of the sci-
ences is put forward in his various works under the appropriate title, such as ethics, physics, cos-
mology, meteorology, rhetoric, metaphysics etc. In the Metaphysics, Aristotle offers a hierarchy of 
the sciences in which the theoretical sciences (mathematics, physics and theology) are placed high-
er than their relatives in the practical realm (geometry, astronomy) and they are all opposed to 
the accidental sciences about categories and the distinctions between possibilities and actualities. 
Theoretical sciences fundamentally differ from the practical and productive sciences (or arts); and 
“there is no science of the accidental […]; for all science is either of that which is always or of that 
which is for the most part” (1025 a–1027 a).
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an ascetic Lebensführung which renounced culture and civilization and 
entrusted itself to the universal spirit of divine providence.4
Plato and Aristotle did not appear to be strongly distinct thinkers in 
Antiquity. In Neo-Platonism, Plato represented the omniscient master 
and Aristotle the ingenious disciple; Plato offered the general framework, 
Aristotle was to be thanked for the fill in details.5 Their difference, how-
ever, became more evident especially in Arab thought and, following the 
influence of Muslim scholarship in the West, in European Christianity 
as well.6 Appropriate investigations uncovered their different approach-
es to reality, and their methodologies were subsequently distinguished 
along the lines of the difference between a significantly theoretical and 
a rather practical kind of reasoning. While this difference is detectable in 
their writings, it was only in the Italian Renaissance that certain think-
ers recognized this difference as emblematic. Raphael’s famous fresco, 
“The School of Athens” of 1511 expressed this understanding.7 On the 
fresco in the Vatican Museums, Plato and Aristotle are facing the ob-
server and one of them, Plato, points upwards to the sky with his right 
forefinger, while Aristotle makes a gesture of a downward grasp equally 
with his right hand. Plato holds the Timaeus, the central book of ancient 
cosmology, and Aristotle carries his Ethics as a reference to practical wis-
dom. Raphael’s message is obvious: Plato represents the knowledge of the 
4 Hadot, Pierre: Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? Paris 1996. – We find clear trac-
es of this ascetic way of life in what we know about Socrates from Plato. For instance, in the Sym-
posium we read: “One morning he was thinking about something which he could not resolve; he 
would not give it up, but continued thinking from early dawn until noon –there he stood fixed in 
thought; and at noon attention was drawn to him, and the rumor ran through the wondering crowd 
that Socrates had been standing and thinking about something ever since the break of day. At last, 
in the evening after supper, some Ionians out of curiosity (I should explain that this was not in win-
ter but in summer), brought out their mats and slept in the open air that they might watch him and 
see whether he would stand all night. There he stood until the following morning; and with the re-
turn of light he offered up a prayer to the sun, and went his way” (Symposium, 220 c–d).
5 We find this approach for instance in Plotinus’ works. 
6 The Classical Heritage in Islam, ed. and trans. F. Rosenthal, Berkeley 1975; M. Maróth, 
Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie, Leiden, New York 1994.
7 Raphael’s typology nevertheless follows Aristotle’s classification of the sciences into 
theoretical and practical in the Metaphysics (1025 a ff.).
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cosmos, the “skies,” the “things on high,” while Aristotle stands for prag-
matic knowledge of moral action. One kind of knowledge is theoretical, 
the other is practical, one is speculative, the other is constructive. This 
typology is apt to be represented artistically while it discloses a philo-
sophical insight as well. Raphael obviously created a symbol of the most 
fundamental typology in the history of philosophy, a typology influenc-
ing deeply the subsequent centuries.8
From the philosophical point of view, Raphael’s distinction seems to 
be generalizing. We do find the outlines of a systematic metaphysics in 
Aristotle and, on the other hand, Plato reveals an intimate knowledge of 
the empirical sciences, such as astronomy, geography, or biology. Still, the 
history of philosophy after Plato and Aristotle can be comfortably seen 
as belonging to the one or the other type. This interpretation permeates 
Western philosophy at least up to the nineteenth century when the differ-
ence between German transcendentalism and Anglo-American pragma-
tism expressed a strong antagonism reminiscent of the divergence depict-
ed in The School of Athens. In our days, we still find the Raphaelite-looking 
distinction between Continental philosophies on the one hand, and An-
glo-American kinds of thought on the other hand.
Philosophy, in our sense today, appears to be a  Janus-faced tradi-
tion, the significance of which is now challenged from two important 
sides. On the one hand, authors like Martin Heidegger claimed that 
philosophy in the classical sense had reached its end, because it dis-
solved in the various branches of the sciences, natural, mathematical, 
or social.9 On the other hand, scientists, such as Richard Hawking, re-
cently claimed that philosophy lost its relevance to our contemporary 
culture, because it did not have an answer to the challenges of scientific 
8 According to A. N. Whitehead, “It was Plato who formulated most of philosophy’s ba-
sic questions–and doubts. It was Aristotle who laid the foundation for most of the answers. There-
after, the record of their duel is the record of man’s long struggle to deny and surrender or to uphold 
and assert the validity of his particular mode of consciousness” (Whitehead, Review of J. H. Ran-
dall’s Aristotle. The Objectivist Newsletter, May 1963, p. 18).
9 M. Heidegger, The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, [in:] idem, Basic Writ-
ings, ed. D. Farrell Krell, San Francisco 1993. 
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development.10 Moreover, certain theological schools, especially that of 
Karl Barth, revisited the earlier thesis of Protestant theology about the 
ambivalent role of philosophy as opposed to faith and gave their antag-
onism a new momentum.11
3. The Cosmo-Theological View
The works of Classical philosophers, and many of their followers, are 
indeed a goldmine for anyone interested in old forms of human thought. 
However, there are some fundamental features entailed in these philos-
ophies, features which determine the entire tradition of philosophy and 
may appear today as weird or even plainly unacceptable. I do not only 
mean such points as Plato’s description of the inner organs of the human 
body, because besides its symbolic purpose, the description is childish 
for today’s readers.12 Or I do not mean merely Aristotle’s apparent logi-
cal conclusion to the water-like nature of the human eye, as opposed to 
its supposed light-emissive nature, which he verified by observing the 
decomposing of eyeballs.13 Similar descriptions and prima facie verifica-
tions belong to the collection of ancient grotesqueries. 
Nevertheless, there is an incomparably more important feature of the 
works of ancient philosophers, namely the overall pre-Copernican char-
acter of their world-view. Plato’s meditations on the role of the blood 
in human bodies betray the author’s ignorance of circulation, but this 
10 S. Hawking, The Grand Design, co-authored by Leonard Mlodinov, New York 2010. 
11 There are well argued views according to which Barth considered philosophy in 
a more positive way, cf. K. Oakes, Karl Barth on Philosophy and Theology, Oxford 2012. 
12 One example: “The spleen which is situated in the neighborhood, on the left side, 
keeps the liver bright and clean, as a napkin does a mirror, and the evacuations of the liver are re-
ceived into it; and being a hollow tissue it is for a time swollen with these impurities, but when the 
body is purged it returns to its natural size” (Timaeus 72 c).
13 “True, then, the visual organ proper is composed of water, yet vision appertains to it 
not because it is so composed, but because it is translucent – a property common alike to water and 
to air. But water is more easily confined and more easily condensed than air; wherefore it is that the 
pupil, i.e. the eye proper, consists of water” (Aristotle, De sensu, transl. by J. I. Beare, see: www.eb-
ooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/sense [28.03.2013]).
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failure did not influence other parts of his philosophy.14 Yet the pre-Co-
pernican view of the universe offered an understanding of the cosmos as 
an organic unity in which human beings possess a central place in order 
that they can view the circulation of the stellar bodies and accommodate 
their entire life to these movements. This universal understanding in-
deed permeates the whole attitude, general features and particular views 
of these authors so that no important part of these philosophies can be 
understood without taking into account the pre-Copernican view. I em-
phasize that this view is not merely “astronomical” in our sense today, 
but rather an overarching mystical perspective in which the origin and 
end of human beings, the meaning of the universe itself, the role of his-
tory, societies, and the sciences are conceived as forming a meaningful 
whole, which is described precisely by what they called “philosophy”. 
One of the most succinct summaries of this view can be found in Cice-
ro’s famous Scipio’s Dream.15
14 Timaeus 79 e. Plato conjectured that the blood is in motion in the body, but he did not 
recognize the role of the heart. 
15 In Cicero’s Republic we read “Men are created under these terms, that they are to look 
after that globe which you see in the middle of this precinct, which is called earth; and they are given 
a soul from those eternal fires which you call constellations and stars, which are spherical globes en-
dowed with divine minds and accomplish their rotations and revolutions with amazing speed. And so, 
Publius, both you and all pious people must keep your soul in the guardianship of the body, and you 
must not depart from human life without the order of him who gave you your soul: you must not seem 
to run away from the human duty assigned by the god. […] That way of life is the way to the heavens 
and to this gathering of those who have ceased to live and after having been released from the body 
now inhabit the place you see’ (it was a bright circle shining among the stars with a most radiant white-
ness), ‘which you have learned from the Greeks to name the Milky Way.’ And from that point, as I stud-
ied everything, it all seemed to me glorious and marvelous. There were stars which we never see from 
this place, and their size was such as we have never suspected; the smallest one was the one furthest 
from the heavens and closest to earth and shone with borrowed light” (Cicero, On the Commonwealth. 
On the Law, ed. by James E. G. Zetzel, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p. 97). – See also Plato’s Republic where 
we find a description which highlights the relationship between naked eye observation of the starry 
heavens and the mental image of perfect heavenly circulations and order. “The starry heaven which we 
behold is wrought upon a visible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visi-
ble things, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute swiftness and abso-
lute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry with them that which is contained in them, in 
the true number and in every true figure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, 
but not by sight. […] The spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that high-
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I term this perspective “cosmo-theology.” I am aware of various uses of 
this expression,16 yet the phrase still does what I mean by it: it points out 
er knowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently wrought by the hand of 
Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may chance to behold; any geometrician who saw them 
would appreciate the exquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that in 
them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any other proportion. […] And will 
not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the movements of the stars? Will he not 
think that heaven and the things in heaven are framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect man-
ner? But he will never imagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of the 
month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any other things that are material and 
visible can also be eternal and subject to no deviation – that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd 
to take so much pains in investigating their exact truth” (529–530). See also the famous passage in the 
Timaeus: “The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit to us, for had we never seen the 
stars, and the sun, and the heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would 
ever have been uttered. But now the sight of day and night, and the months and the revolutions of the 
years, have created number, and have given us a conception of time, and the power of enquiring about 
the nature of the universe; and from this source we have derived philosophy, than which no greater 
good ever was or will be given by the gods to mortal man. This is the greatest boon of sight: and of the 
lesser benefits why should I speak? Even the ordinary man if he were deprived of them would bewail 
his loss, but in vain. Thus much let me say however: God invented and gave us sight to the end that we 
might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our own intel-
ligence which are akin to them, the unperturbed to the perturbed; and that we, learning them and par-
taking of the natural truth of reason, might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate 
our own vagaries” (Timaeus 47 b–c).
16 My expression of cosmo-theology originates in the term “cosmo-theism” coined by 
Lamoignon de Malesherbes and applied in our time by Helmuth von Glasenapp and Jan Assmann. An 
alternative origin of the term can be traced back to Kant’s distinction between “cosmotheology” and “on-
totheology” in the Critique of Pure Reason (B 659/A 631). Assmann uses the “cosmotheism” in his var-
ious writings, such as in Moses the Egyptian (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997, 142). 
According to my understanding of cosmo-theology, the term refers to this: The basic structures of real-
ity become accessible especially in the phenomena of the sky (sun, moon, planets, stars, constellations 
etc.), that is in their movements and relationships. The cosmo-theological pattern determines theistic 
and monotheistic schemes of earlier and later religious forms, to some extent those of Christianity as 
well, and thus imbues human consciousness in a fashion which remains effective in various ways even 
in the age of science. As to the history of the content of this notion, one must refer to Charles-Francois 
Dupuis (1742–1809) whose monumental Origin de tous les cultes (1795) demonstrated – however also 
distorted – the importance of cosmic experience in the emergence of religious beliefs. Dupuis was a ge-
nius who tended to misinterpret his own important discoveries. Franz Cumont describes the content 
of cosmo-theology (in his words “cosmic emotion”) as follows: “The resplendent stars, which eternally 
pursue their silent course above us, are divinities endowed with personality and animated feelings. On 
the other hand, the soul is a particle detached from the cosmic fires. The warmth which animates the 
human microcosm is part of the same substance which vivifies the universe, the reason which guides us, 
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that the ancient authors considered the universe as the expression of a di-
vine entity and human beings as expressions of important, perhaps even 
decisive, moments of this universe. Cosmo-theologians were thinking in 
universal terms, because they aimed at the whole of a pre-Copernican cos-
mos and sought, in some way, to influence it; and they were theologians, 
because they considered the cosmos divine and saw human beings as mo-
ments of the divine functioning of the universe. That is, this view consid-
ered the cosmos and human beings as forming a living whole produced 
and directed by a divine being immanent in, or in some sense transcend-
ent to, the universe. Physical nature, especially astronomical objects, was 
seen as the central expression of the cosmo-theological character of reali-
ty, which shaped nature, culture, and history. The human mind, as already 
Plato suggested, should be adapted to the movements of the “intelligences 
in the heaven,” that is to the planetary and stellar movements, in order 
that human beings may become harmonized with the universe and thus, 
through the correction of the error of physical nature, with the godhead.17
Inasmuch as this approach to reality was shared by the most influential 
philosophers not only of the Hellenic era but even for many centuries after 
it, including the Christian centuries, we can securely say that their world-
view was magical or even plainly mythological.18 While it is often claimed 
partakes of the nature of those luminaries which enlighten it. Itself a fiery essence, it is a kin to the gods 
which glitter in the firmament. Thus contemplation of the heaven becomes a communion” (F. Cumont, 
Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans, New York 1960, p. 79–80).
17 As to the harmony between the stars and the mind, see again Timaeus 47 b–c. The 
problem of transcendence is raised by the passages in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (1072–73) where it 
seems that the unmoved mover of the universe has to have a substance in order to produce physi-
cal movement. On the other hand, the expression “κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον” (1072 b) seems to sug-
gest that the way this ultimate principle moves the universe is emotional. 
18 C. S. Lewis’ The Discarded Image (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) is 
a faithful summary of the manifold influence of cosmo-theology throughout and beyond the Mid-
dle Ages; he calls this view “The Model.” Nevertheless, C. S. Lewis is interested rather in the literary 
monuments of “the Model” and did not scrutinize its overall philosophical and theological signifi-
cance. Accordingly, he underestimates the epoch-making significance of cosmo-theology and does 
not properly evaluate its philosophical and theological consequences for our understanding of re-
ality today. Nevertheless, along the lines of authors, such as Dupuis, Cumon, Drews, and Assmann, 
S. C. Lewis belongs to the important discoverers of cosmo-theology.
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that philosophy introduced the rule of “logos” after the epoch of “myth,” 
the fact is that this “logos” of the philosophers was often closer to mythol-
ogy than to our rationality today. The difference between a mythological 
and a cosmo-theological approach to reality consists in their levels of pre-
cision: the mythological view is closer to the world of fairy tales, while al-
ways disclosing some moral, sometimes even cosmo-theological insights. 
The cosmo-theological view, nevertheless, presupposed a more accurate 
knowledge of nature, mathematics, and astronomy, so that its premises 
and conclusions could be understood as scientific and used for formulat-
ing fairly precise inferences. It must be however emphatically added that 
the cosmo-theological view substantially changed in Christian thought: 
while in Cicero we find an animated and divine universe, with the earth 
and human beings in its center, the center of reality for Christianity is God 
himself; and the universe comes to the fore only as an expression of God’s 
free creating act. Nevertheless, as we can see in many authors from St. 
Augustine to St. Thomas or Dante, the cosmo-theological view possessed 
a deep influence on Christian philosophy, theology, and art.19
Even though some trends in traditional philosophy became special-
ized in the problems of physics, logic, rhetoric, morals, or even biology, 
the overall cosmo-theological pattern determined its fundamental con-
cepts and procedures. The hierarchical view of the cosmos served as the 
pattern of a moral and political hierarchy; logical relations were seen as 
expressed to some extent by the observable relations among stellar ob-
jects, all considered as embodying a rational living being. Theology was 
shaped in accordance with “the teachings of the heavens,” so that even 
the notion of an unmoved mover could be conceived on the basis of the 
19 See Thomas, Summa theologiae, I, 70, 3: “One being may be nobler than another abso-
lutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bod-
ies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely, it must be conceded that they are superior to them 
with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in 
potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that 
moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.” – Widespread doubts about the soul-filled character 
of stars (even in the sense of Thomas) were confirmed by the discovery of the telescope and Galileo’s 
investigations presented in The Starry Messenger of 1610. However, way beyond this time the convic-
tion that the stars are living beings in a certain sense could be found even among leading scientists. 
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only apparently motionless point on the Northern sky, the Polaris.20 Cer-
tainly, it would be a mistake to say that the cosmo-theological view of 
the universe was a simple copy of optical experience. Cosmo-theologians 
were sophisticated thinkers, as for instance Plato shows, and they never 
dared to identify the ultimate truth with optical or any kind of sensual 
perception. As Plato writes, we “need to suffer of the things in the heav-
ens” if we want “to have a part in the true science of astronomy.”21 That 
is, we need optical experience, but without mental work (and without 
a kind of mystical experience) we cannot have an insight into truth. On 
the other hand it would be an exaggeration to say that logic, mathemat-
ics, morality, politics etc. were nothing more than just replicas of “the 
teachings of the heavens.” In all these fields, genuine and specific discov-
eries were made and used for further arguments and conjectures. How-
ever, the overall pattern of cosmo-theology determined the framework 
and the main structures of a conceptual world in which philosophy lived, 
moved, and existed; and the sight of the heavenly bodies, the stars and 
the planets, the seasons and vegetation offered a schema without which 
“philosophy” would have been meaningless.
The most important features of the cosmo-theological view are as 
follows:
•	 The notion of lower nature as fundamentally moldable by higher 
or divine nature;
•	 The notion of nature as containing structures reproducible in 
particular products of human action;
•	 The notions of objectivity and subjectivity;
•	 Imitation as the essence of human action;
20 See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1073 a: “The first principle and primary reality is immov-
able, both essentially and accidentally, but it excites the primary motion, which is one and eternal.” 
As it appears from the text, the first mover must be of a sort of substance which is able to move oth-
er substances, such as the spheres, the stars, and the planets. 
21 The expression of “to suffer of the things in the heavens” (τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ 
ἐάσομεν) is translated as “to leave the things in the heavens alone.” This version is based on the 
double meaning of ἐάω: let be and let alone. Most probably, the author of the Platonic text used this 
ambiguous formula with the intention of offering two possible readings: one for the interested and 
another for the disinterested. See also Republic 530 b-c. 
120 Balázs M. Mezei
•	 Human beings conceived along the lines of the “intelligences of 
the heavens;”
•	 The lack of the notion of genuine difference and genuine newness;
•	 History as a cyclical process.
“Nature” in the sense characteristic of the “Earth” is by its essence 
open to formation by cosmic influences, the rules of the “heavens.” 
Based on this notion of nature, “phusis” or “natura” became understood 
as the target of modification, influence, and exploitation. Higher nature 
is eternal and cannot be changed; lower nature is receptive to higher na-
ture and follows the latter inasmuch as possible. Human beings are free 
to follow or unfollow higher nature; and they are able to reach the ulti-
mate source of reality and participate in the overall configuration of the 
universe.22 Moreover, humans can imitate the heavens in that they pro-
duce things which are new to nature yet use natural processes as their 
principles, such as simple or more complicated machines. It seems that 
the main intention of machine-building in Antiquity may have been the 
production of a replica of the world, such as Plato’s μίμημα (Timaeus 40 
d) and similar planetariums. Engineers, such as Heron of Alexandria 
produced more particular machines as well. For instance, as Claudian 
describes, cleverly arranged magnets were used to set in motion sacred 
sculptures in the temple of Mars and Venus to create the scene of a sexu-
al union of the two deities during liturgy.23 These efforts were dependent 
on the view of nature’s nature as governed by higher influences; and of 
human beings as mediators of such influences. Humans, nevertheless, 
were conceived themselves as replicas of higher entities, such as plan-
ets and starts, and thus their shadow-like being did not allow the emer-
gence of the notion of genuine subjectivity.24
22 See especially Aristotle’s description of the ultimate principles of the heavens in Meta-
physics 1072 ff. Plato speaks of ταὐτόν and θάτερον (the Same and the Other: the sphere of the fixed 
stars, and the sphere of the planets) in Timaeus 35, 37, 44.
23 C. Claudianus, Works, London 1922, vol. 2, p. 234 ff. 
24 Plato famously claimed (Timaeus 41) that there are exactly as many stars in the heav-
ens as many souls, some of them living on the on Earth. This parallelism shows that human beings 
are actually stellar objects in an earthly modification. 
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The ancient notion of objectivity, as embodying the eternal and valid 
structures of reality, was modeled above all on the “skies” and their appar-
ent regular movements. It is beyond question that everyday objectivity 
of sense-perception helps the emergence of a massive feel of objectivity; 
but precisely this latter is most importantly represented by the impression 
the “eternal movements” of the stars.25 In the framework of cosmo-the-
ology, the notion of objectivity was reinforced by the experience of the 
movements of the “heavens.” I stress that the main faculty related to the 
cosmo-theological experience is vision. It belongs to the nature of human 
sight that, even though its contents are determined by the optical mech-
anisms of the eye, its production appears preeminently “objective.” The 
cosmo-theological view of reality was based on naked eye observation 
and thus the overwhelming nature of the cosmo-theological experience 
received an additional support from the objectivity characteristic of hu-
man vision. Subjectivity was defined in accordance with this objectivity: 
In this framework, the subject was conceived as the complementary pole, 
the negative of objectivity. Thus subjectivity became an optical subjectivity 
which is capable of the sight of the universe and defined accordingly as an 
integral part of it. Subjectivity was defined objectively.26
As a consequence of the objective view of the universe, the main activ-
ity of human individuals, their societies, and even history had to be con-
ceived as imitations or replicas of the objective order of the heavens. From 
times immemorial, the main feasts of developed societies have been de-
termined in accordance with the movements and constellations of heav-
enly bodies, most importantly the Sun and the Moon. Even Christianity 
25 Kant famously referred to the “starry sky” as the most important external source of 
wonder: “Two things fill the mind with ever-increasing wonder and awe, the more often and the 
more intensely the mind of thought is drawn to them: the starry heavens above me and the moral 
law within me” (Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, part 2, Conclusion: http://www.gutenberg.org/
cache/epub/5683/pg5683.html [28.03.2013]).
26 Here we can mention one of the central views of the main representative of biocentricm, 
Robert Lanza. As he repeatedly writes, the “external world” is derived mainly from optical experience, 
but quantum theory does not confirm the well-grounded nature of our optical experience. I add: in 
cosmo-theology, the extreme objectification intrinsic in visual perception serves as the basis of an en-
tire system the remnants of which still determines our world-views, especially physics. 
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continued this tradition so that, among other feasts, Christmas and Easter 
are still settled on by characteristic stellar times—the shortest day of the 
year (in accordance with the per-modern calendar) for Christmas, and the 
first full moon after the spring equinox for Easter.27 Human individuals 
were called to imitate the heavenly movements, stellar and planetary rela-
tions; and even the notion of an “imitatio Christi” continued this tradition 
of a cosmic simulation put into an allegorical context. That is, imitation of 
the skies, the will of the gods or God, the imitation of great prophets, kings, 
and heroes all belonged to the essence of the cosmo-theological view. 
Thereby human beings became replicas or reflections of paramount per-
sonalities, even mythical ones with stellar connotations, such like Hercules 
or Perseus. The notion of human personhood, in the sense we know it to-
day, could not have its rightful place in the mind of the ancients. Imitation 
as the central feature of human activity — a feature which did not exclude, 
merely determined, the notion of free will — hampered the insight into the 
value of genuine newness in the realms of human action or history. More 
importantly, the universal hierarchy of analogies blocked the perception of 
the value of genuine difference, the power of “the totally other” as we meet 
this expression today in philosophy as well as in theology.28
Similarly, history could not be seen otherwise than a reflection of the 
“eternal circulations” of the heavenly bodies. Historical epochs, the fall 
and rise of political powers were considered too as reflections of goings-on 
27 Dupuis, Origine de tous les Cultes, vol. V. Dupuis realized that the fundamental texts 
of Christianity reflect the cosmo-theological view. He misinterpreted, however, his own discovery 
inasmuch as he concluded that the figure of Christ was a literary fiction based on the experience of 
the Sun. This is a non sequitur. While these texts are clearly determined by the cosmo-theological 
pattern, their authors saw this pattern as materialized in real occurrences on Earth. The essence of 
the cosmo-theological pattern is precisely this that real occurrences reveal it; and the task of a biog-
rapher, such as an evangelist, was to show this pattern as realized in real goings-on in everyday cir-
cumstances. In other words, Dupuis was seriously mistaken to believe that the figure of Christ was 
not real; he was right nevertheless in showing that the figure of Christ was seen as revealing a high-
er order of things as conceived in the natural experience of the sky.
28 The modern use of the expression “totaliter aliter” originates in Rudolf Otto’s The Holy 
of 1917 and was subsequently applied by Karl Barth in a characteristic sense to point out the abso-
lute difference between the human world and divine reality. 
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in the sky, even if it must have been very difficult to establish the precise 
correspondences in concrete cases.29 Nevertheless, a “cyclical” view of his-
tory did not possess a perfect pattern on the sky: as it was evident for 
the ancient astronomers, celestial orbits did not represent a perfect circle. 
A “cyclical” notion of history could not be conceived, accordingly, as the 
realization of an eternal cyclical pattern in which the same things recur 
forever. The cosmo-theological view contained the recognition that the 
human eye could not see perfect circulations, only imperfect ones. That 
was the reason why Plato advised his readers to concentrate on mental as-
tronomy, based on the imperfect optical astronomy, since the latter only 
approximated abstract arithmetical structures. Nevertheless, the supposi-
tion that a perfect formula can be spelled out, or at least that the mystically 
perfect circle can be realized, was a sufficient ground for the cosmo-theo-
logians to ponder about the cause of the difference between the observa-
ble imperfect cosmos and the perfect formula. The explanation we have is 
ingenious: as Plato expounds in the myth of the “chariot allegory,” the once 
perfect circulation of the heavens was broken by a destructive principle, 
embodied in the black horse of the chariot.30 We can interpret this allego-
ry as an explanation of a catastrophe of a cosmic dimension, which had to 
have three kinds of consequences: First, this catastrophe leads to the un-
raveling of the various heavenly spheres, each corresponding to a certain 
level of perfection or imperfection. Second, the catastrophe launches the 
29 Virgil, nevertheless, connected the rule of Augustus to a new planetary situation in 
the Fourth Eclogue: 
“Now the last age by Cumae’s Sibyl sung
has come and gone, and the majestic roll
of circling centuries begins anew:
justice returns, returns old Saturn’s reign,
with a new breed of men sent down from heaven.
Only do thou, at the boy’s birth in whom
the iron shall cease, the golden race arise,
befriend him, chaste Lucina; ‘tis thine own
Apollo reigns.”
(Transl. by J. B. Greenough) 
30 Phaedrus 246 a–254 e.
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cosmic wandering of souls which leads from the star-form to human and 
subhuman existences, and then back to the stellar form again. Thirdly, the 
catastrophe is the beginning of a historical process of decline and renewal. 
As can be seen, the cyclical nature of history could well fit in with a notion 
of history of fall and redemption and did not necessitate a uniform return 
of selfsame structures.31
4. Departing from Cosmo-Theology
What I attempted to delineate briefly above leads us to realize two 
things: First, the Western tradition of philosophy was fundamentally de-
termined by the cosmo-theological understanding of the universe. Sec-
ond, this understanding was not merely peripheral or negligible, but 
defined the whole conceptual schema of philosophy, its fundamental 
notions, relations, objectives, and most importantly philosophy’s un-
derstanding of human beings. It is an understandable endeavor to flesh 
out the meaning of many of our philosophical concepts by going back 
to the very sources, especially to Greek and Latin philosophy. Howev-
er, it is a serious mistake to believe that such a return could replace the 
more important task of clarifying the fundamental structures of the cos-
mo-theological worldview and its relation to our traditional philosoph-
ical notions. A “re-Hellenization” of philosophy, as well as a  return to 
Aristotle in order to find a sound notion of reason or moral virtue, are 
important philosophical proposals, yet they remain insufficient: we need 
to see not only the original meaning of certain conceptions, but their 
overall position as well in the cosmo-theological view.32 And we need 
to see the development by which these notions became abstracted from 
their original matrix and acquired a meaning in which the cosmo-the-
ological layer was still present. The notion of a virtue is certainly one of 
31 Plato remains silent about the meaning of the process of fall and redemption. Some-
times he hints at an aim, namely the self-contained life of the universe. Fall and redemption are 
necessary for the purification not only of the souls but also of the godhead, since the universe as 
a perfect and eternal whole has “his own waste providing his own food” (Timaeus 33 c).
32 B. Mezei, Reason and Revelation after Auschwitz, New York 2013, p. 269–284.
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these important concepts in which the original cosmo-theological nu-
cleus of “ἕξις” — the capacity of producing action in a fashion analogous 
to the intelligible and “habitual” movements of stars — became blurred, 
individualized, and structured in a moral system in which forgetfulness 
gradually suppressed the cosmo-theological pattern.33
Modern philosophy could not fundamentally detach from this tradi-
tion of cosmo-theology, because the possibility was not yet given to face 
the tradition in its entirety and to explore its essential structures.34 How-
ever, the slow demythologization of philosophy had a strong beginning 
already in the texts of Plato and Aristotle. While in these authors the cos-
mo-theological background is often obvious, in many passages of their 
writings the pattern remains hidden. The reader may have the impres-
sion that this latency is the result of tactful editorial work. For instance, 
Plato would have been able to spell out the philosophical relevance of the 
Myth of Er at the end of the Republic in clear astronomical terms, yet he 
chose an obscure mythical form. Similarly, Aristotle’s concise style is able 
to hide that his dry way of writing even on apparently specific subjects 
presupposes the cosmo-theological framework of the De coelo and other 
cosmological writings. Christian writers followed this path of an imper-
fect demythologization, while on the metaphysical and religious level the 
influence of cosmo-theology remained in force.35
33 Aristotle’s discussions point to the astronomical dimension at crucial points. For in-
stance, in the Nicomachian Ethics, one discussion on “sophia” leads to the conclusion that “sophia” 
cannot be identical with politics or government, because human beings are not the most perfect be-
ings in reality, “since there exist other things far more divine in their nature than man, for instance, 
to mention the most visible, the things of which the celestial system is composed” (1141 a–b). This 
is a reference to stellar entities which Aristotle considers “gods” (Metaphysics 1026 a; 1074 b). 
34 I need to mention Dupuis again, for he produced an overall analysis of the cosmo-theo-
logical pattern. However, his superficial naturalism and logical non-sequiturs hindered a deeper recep-
tion of his work during the subsequent decades after 1795, the publication of Origine de tous les Cultes.
35 Already the New Testament is full with cosmo-theological allusions beginning with 
the Star of Bethlehem through the heavy Hellenistic astrological symbolism in John’s Revelations to 
Jesus’ words referring to the signs in the heavens (Luk 21:11), or to “heavens” in the plural (en tois 
ouranois) in Our Father, a hint to the spherical notion of the universe. A systematic exploration of 
the cosmo-theological character of the New Testament was offered by Arthur Drews; however, be-
cause of the exaggerations of the author’s interpretations, his discovery of the cosmo-theological 
pattern did not have its due recognition. 
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However, a more substantial wave of demythologizing became possi-
ble with the new emphasis on the human subject, the modern principle 
of the “ego cogito.” With this principle — which had been known again to 
some ancient authors, such as Augustine — the master role of the heav-
enly pattern began to decline; instead, the fundamental role of the hu-
man subject as an “I” came to the fore. By this change, the possibility was 
given for an overall reassessment of the cosmo-theological pattern. Nev-
ertheless, the “res extensa” of the Cartesian philosophy of nature was still 
a natural entity in its traditional meaning, an entity which could be con-
sidered as open to human manipulation. And the notion of the human 
subject as “res cogitans” did not properly express the character of human 
personhood except in its relation to the external world as a mathemati-
cal-geometrical entity. The way to a gradually emerging new view of re-
ality was opened, however, by the more proper understanding of human 
subjectivity and personhood, which happened in several steps after Des-
cartes, most importantly in German transcendental philosophies. In the 
latter tradition, which originated in Kant’s famous Critiques, the recog-
nition of the genuine nature of human subjectivity smoothed the path to 
a new, non-cosmo-theological understanding of reality. Reality began to 
lose its connection to the archaic notion of nature and became more and 
more emphatically bound up with the human person as its core.
On the other hand, the emphasis on human personhood disclosed 
the possibility of subjectivism, even solipsism, which degraded human 
personhood to a worldly entity and blocked the way again to an overall 
evaluation of the cosmo-theological heritage. In Kant’s system, a defec-
tive notion of human perception or in Hegel’s thought the notion of the 
universal history of the spirit lacked important features which did not 
allow an overall revision of the traditional pattern. Kant remained a sen-
sualist in terms of experience, and Hegel did not recognize the Platonic, 
thus cosmo-theological, roots of an idealizing speculation.36 Moreover, 
36 Many criticisms of Hegel, such as those of Schelling or Voegelin, emphasized “posi-
tive” philosophy of reality as a whole (Schelling), or reality as an objective history of symbolic forms 
(Voegelin), in contrast to Hegel’s merely conceptual or even “Gnostic” speculation.
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without a  systematic exploration of the fundamental structures of the 
philosophical tradition, these philosophers and their followers were not 
able to overcome the defects originating in the centaur-like combination 
of new insights and traditional structures. The great philosophical rebels 
of the nineteenth century, such as Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, clearly rec-
ognized the insufficiency of transcendentalism as a view open to a sub-
jectivist interpretation of reality and human persons, that is to say, as 
an approach in which remnants of the old structures of cosmo-theology 
survived. Kierkegaard emphasized the notion of the godhead as “abso-
lutely different” from what the human mind can conceive; and Nietzsche, 
far from being a representative of a “philosophical bestiary,”37 desperately 
tried to overcome the obscured remnants of a  traditional view of mo-
rality, politics, culture, and metaphysics. Their criticisms did not reach 
its aim, because these philosophers lacked the recognition of the impor-
tance of a systematic and historical demythologization of philosophy.
In the twentieth century, Husserl’s experiential idealism or Heide-
gger’s existential ontology were important steps to unmask the cos-
mo-theological tradition. However, these thinkers did not recognize the 
necessity of a historical and formal analysis of this heritage.38 They did 
offer a  “destruction” of the philosophical tradition. While, both Hus-
serl and Heidegger used this expression in slightly different meanings, 
they lacked the most important tool for a sufficient “destruction,” name-
ly the recognition of the mythical origin and contents of most of the 
37 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame Press 
1984, p. 22.
38 In spite of the enormous literature on Plato and other Classical authors, the determin-
ing factor of the cosmo-theological view of the universe has not been clearly recognized. The main 
reason for this is that most of the authors did not see the prevalent nature of the mystical view of 
the universe. Among the few authors who nevertheless realized the importance of the cosmo-theo-
logical view we find the Czech philosopher Jan Patočka. As Patočka explains, Plato first developed 
the notion of the ideas and then identified the ideas with planets and stars. While this chronolo-
gy is clearly mistaken, Patočka did recognize the role of cosmo-theology in Plato, while he did not 
elaborate this recognition. See Jan Patočka’s Negative Platonism: Reflections concerning the Rise, the 
Scope and the Demise of Metaphysics—and Whether Philosophy Can Survive It, [in:] idem, Philoso-
phy and Selected Writings, ed. and transl. E. Kohák, Chicago–London 1989, p. 175–206.
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philosophical vocabulary, that is, they did not recognize the cosmo-the-
ological framework. What Husserl wrote on the history of philosophy 
did not go beyond Kant’s schema of a  struggle between “dogmatism” 
and “critical philosophy.” What Heidegger offered, most importantly 
in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, was an important criticism of fundamen-
tal Platonic notions, mainly the role of the idea as “the yoke” of Being. 
Heidegger, nevertheless, did not see the importance of the cosmo-theo-
logical framework in Plato. Neither Husserl, nor Heidegger realized that 
not only the history of Western philosophy was “a footnote to Plato,” as 
Whitehead famously remarked,39 but the basic conceptions of this phil-
osophical tradition had been determined by the hidden pattern of the 
cosmo-theological view. Due to this deficiency, the phenomenological 
and existential-ontological attempts to overcome the cosmo-theological 
tradition lacked a systematic point of view and remained, in their main 
structures, attached to transcendentalism.40
As a reaction to transcendentalism, several waves of historical criticism 
emerged which focused on the history of the forms of human thought, 
such as those of Dilthey, Jaspers, Cassirer, or Voegelin. In fact, the philos-
ophers of symbolic forms added a very important correction to transcen-
dentalism, namely the component of an encompassing historical criticism 
of the forms of human thinking. In this way, the possibility of an overall 
criticism of philosophy as it became determined by cosmo-theology was 
already given. Yet no philosopher so far has endeavored successfully to 
map out the range and importance of this criticism in the historical as well 
as transcendental terms. Philosophy had reached the limit of its classical 
European development by the mid-twentieth century and subsequently 
39 “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it 
consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmol-
ogy, New York 1979, p. 39).
40 Heidegger’s term of “onto-theology” expresses a criticism different from my criticism 
of cosmo-theology. Onto-theology is a Heideggerian term for a metaphysical use of the logical mis-
take of “pars pro toto:” Being is seen in terms of beings, the whole is reduced to the level of its parts. 
The criticism of cosmo-theology, however, is a form of historical criticism. Nevertheless, this criti-
cism points to our insufficient understanding of reality in its entirety and historicity. 
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it lived on the past results by offering various interpretations, correc-
tions, and reconsiderations. In contrast, academic philosophy in the An-
glo-American world rarely recognizes the initial character and the natural 
limits of its heritage. Instead, it concentrates merely on certain perspec-
tives in which the cosmo-theological tradition is not identified and there-
fore its conceptual schema remains caught up in a philosophical naïveté. 
As a consequence, in contemporary thought we have a range of philoso-
phies which analyze various aspects of this tradition without recognizing 
the underlying role of an ancient view of reality, a view determining the 
self-reflection of mankind for many thousands years.
5. The Role of Christian Philosophy
The mere question whether there is “Christian philosophy” at all may 
seem to be a  kind of academic hypocrisy. For already by raising such 
a question we logically acknowledge a certain possibility of Christian phi-
losophy inasmuch as the two terms — “Christianity” and “philosophy” 
— are not mutually exclusive and their combination does not entail any 
apparent contradiction. The counter-argument to the effect, that the talk 
of “Christian philosophy” is analogous to the talk of “Christian mathemat-
ics” or “Christian physics,” misses the point. The very idea of an eternal 
and objective philosophy, which Christianity could use for its purposes, is 
a remnant of the cosmo-theological pattern. In spite of the admonitions 
of Plato and Aristotle, some philosophers of the subsequent centuries did 
not see the distinction between special sciences and philosophy as an ar-
chitectonic kind of knowledge.41 Philosophy has never been an objective 
science in the sense of the particular, cosmo-theologically determined 
sciences, but rather a universal way of experiencing, understanding, and 
contributing to the life of the universe. From the Christian point of view, 
Christianity was a correction added to pre-Christian thought, and phi-
losophy was fulfilled and perfected in the Christian conception of reality. 
41 As for instance Aristotle suggests, Nicomachian Ethics, 1094 a.
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Philosophy, in this sense, was a corollary to the sciences and pointed to 
the realm of theology properly so called. 42
As opposed to various modern philosophies, Christian philosophy 
has two important advantages: First, traditional Christian philosophy 
has carefully kept the tradition of the cosmo-theological view. Second, 
it was Christianity and its philosophical reflections from St. Augustine 
to contemporary attempts which slowly changed the cosmo-theological 
pattern and secured an appropriate place for an absolutely transcendent 
God on the one hand and for the importance of human beings as ulti-
mate persons, persons stemming from the free and divine act of creation 
on the other hand. These two emphases were going through a long pro-
cess of articulation, in which the beginnings are massively determined 
by the externalist cosmo-theological view, but later on, as a result of the 
efforts of the greatest minds of the Christian centuries, genuine changes 
occurred: the articulation of God’s unique absoluteness and the unique 
ultimacy of human personhood.43
What is often mentioned as the archaism of the tradition of Christian 
philosophy, namely its closeness to Platonism, Aristotelianism, and espe-
cially the presence of Thomism in many of its branches, is in my view an 
advantage in our philosophical situation. The great philosophical revolu-
tions of modernity — Cartesianism and transcendentalism, to name on-
ly the two main trends — have proved to be important yet failed attempts 
to overcome the robust tradition of cosmo-theology. Christian philoso-
phy, in contrast, has always emphasized a certain balance between con-
tinuity and change, and thus it never attempted to dismantle its foun-
dations. In fact, Christian philosophy has always followed a “Tychonic” 
way. As is known, the famous astronomer of the sixteenth century, Tycho 
Brahe sought to combine what he saw the geometrical benefits of the 
Copernican system with the theological benefits of the Ptolemaic system 
42 About the famous French debate on the possibility of Christian Philosophy, see espe-
cially Gilson’s statement in his The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy (transl. A. H. C. Downes, Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press 1991).
43 See Mezei, op. cit., 193–177.
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into his view of the universe. What he proposed was a combination of 
old and new, the philosophical framework of the cosmo-theological 
view of Ptolemy enriched with the results and consequences of observa-
tions of which Tycho was an important practitioner. Let me consider this 
well-adjusted combination of old and new a model. I claim that Christian 
philosophy used this model in its renewals and reformations: it aspired 
to keep the framework of the ancient view and improved it with elements 
of new philosophical discoveries and perspectives throughout the Mid-
dle Ages and modernity up to our day.44
The Tychonic nature of Christian philosophy has been pervasive: 
just think of such different authors as Origen, Augustine, Boethius, 
Thomas Aquinas, Fénelon, the Neo-Aristotelianism and Neo-Thomism 
of the nineteenth century and, in our age, the various philosophical 
proposals by Maritain, Gilson, Rahner, von Balthasar, or Jean-Luc Mar-
ion, to name only some of the most influential thinkers. The Tychonic 
model has been applied variously in the works of these authors. It is 
nevertheless safe to claim without simplification that in all these cases 
the massive presence of the traditional view has been fundamental-
ly maintained and, at the same time, improved by new thoughts and 
perspectives. This has taken place, chronologically, in Platonism, Aris-
totelianism, rationalism, transcendentalism, existentialism, Protestant 
anti-philosophism, and in our time in the methodologies of philosoph-
ical scientism.45 The reason for the dominance of the Tychonic model 
44 The tradition of Pseudo-Dionysius has determined Greek Orthodox theology and 
philosophy in such a measure that philosophy in the Western sense has not developed in Ortho-
dox countries. In the West, nevertheless, the fragmented traditions of Greek philosophy led to the 
emergence of autonomous attempts to improve the tradition. The condition of possibility of the 
non-cosmo-theological development in Western philosophy was precisely the fragmented and in-
sufficient knowledge of the tradition and the reaction to this situation by ingenious thinkers, such 
as Augustine, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas etc. Once this kind of creative philosophizing began, 
the spell of cosmo-theology became weaker until it was broken – yet not fully unmasked – in the 
emergence of subjectivist philosophies of modernity. 
45 Cosmo-theology can be detected even in such authors as e. g. Marion, especially 
when he applies the tradition of negative theology in his thought. A famous representative of sci-
entism in Christian philosophy is Bernard Lonergan. 
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was the effort to maintain and reinforce the traditional Christian view 
of reality. And while the latter view has been subjected to several waves 
of “demythologization” throughout the centuries, Christian philosophy 
escorted these changes without offering too much or too less. After the 
Alexandrian age, Christian philosophy followed an improved version 
of Platonism; in Augustine’s work, it created an existential Platonism; 
in the first Scholasticism it produced Christian Aristotelianism; in the 
second Scholasticism, Christian rationalism; in the nineteenth cen-
tury, Christian philosophy continued to follow the Aristotelian path 
with a new emphasis on the importance of common sense realism and 
technical knowledge. In the twentieth century, Christian philosophy 
absorbed some results of transcendentalism, existentialism, herme-
neutics, structuralism and, in our age, some of its important represent-
atives follow the ideal of a  scientific philosophy, others the develop-
ments of Continental thought with its emphasis on the paradoxical, the 
negative, and the inconceivable.46
The advantage of Christian philosophy’s keeping the traditional, cos-
mo-theological view in its fundamental structures, or else the advan-
tage of avoiding of an overall demythologization of its traditions, can 
be expressed as follows. First, it is in Christian philosophy in which we 
possess a  clear example of the cosmo-theological influences. Funda-
mental notions of Christian philosophy, such as “nature,” “substance,” 
“person,” “knowledge,” “metaphysics,” “morals,” “virtue,” “society,” “tele-
ology,” “certainty” and so on maintain their close connection to ancient 
antecedents; and the latter are safely embedded in the cosmo-theolog-
ical view. The advantage here consists in that a Christian philosopher, 
being aware of the significance of the cosmo-theological character of 
the ancient views, can study, explain, and reinterpret the cosmo-theo-
logical roots of our basic philosophical notions. Second, the Christian 
philosopher becomes thus able to launch an overall demythologizing 
46 See for instance John Haldane’s works for a  sober and analytical approach to 
Thomism. And see especially the works of Michel Henry or Jean-Luc Marion for a Continental 
version of Christian philosophy which absorbed phenomenology and hermeneutics. 
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of philosophy, his own philosophical traditions included. Third, on the 
basis of such a demythologization, the Christian philosopher can search 
for a new understanding of his place in the universe, the significance 
of his traditions, and a new perspective in which he still can be called 
a philosopher and a Christian at the same time.
At this point we need to answer the following questions:
•	 What does exactly mean the expression “demythologizing” in this 
context?
•	 What is the motive of a Christian philosopher for demythologi-
zing the philosophical traditions?
•	 What kind of assistance can a Christian philosopher receive for 
his work from the philosophical tradition or from contemporary 
developments?
•	 What are the fundamental structures of a demythologized Chri-
stian philosophy?
6. The Vocation of a Christian Philosopher
As explained briefly above, the most important task of Christian 
philosophy is a clarification of its fundamental philosophical notions. 
Possible examples abound, but here I focus only on the notion of human 
personhood. The original notion of personhood is rooted in the opti-
cal experience of the external appearance of an individual or a thing.47 
It lasted several centuries until the corresponding Hebrew, Greek and 
Latin terms assumed a meaning relatively close to our understanding 
today. Still, even in this notion of a “prosopon” and “persona,” the ex-
ternal appearance remained decisive as the basic background in the se-
mantic circle of the term.48 During the Trinitarian debates of the first 
47 Mezei, op. cit., 129.
48 In resurrection, as Paul explains in 1 Cor 15:40  ff., human bodies rise just as heavenly 
bodies rise, and human bodies will possess a spiritual body, just as the Sun, the Moon and other stars 
possess their own appropriate glorious bodies. In resurrection, moreover, the first living soul of Adam 
is changed into the life-giving soul of the resurrected. In the background, ancient beliefs of cosmo-
theological kind are clearly recognizable, such as that stellar entities are life-creating beings.
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Christian centuries and the related dogmatic discussions in the subse-
quent epochs made it possible to form a notion of personhood equally 
applicable to every human person and the divine persons; and it was 
Thomas Aquinas who endeavored to attribute personhood not only to 
the persons of the Trinity but also to human individuals.49 The “revo-
lution of personhood” in modern philosophy, most importantly in the 
work of Kant, led to the realization of the unique “dignity” (internal 
worth, Würde) of human persons, a decisive step on the way leading off 
the courses of cosmo-theological thinking.50 However, Western philo-
sophical vocabularies still used versions of the Latin form of “persona” 
and still kept its rootedness in the ancient world-view in a more or less 
latent fashion. I  believe that this latent connection is responsible for 
our lack of an obvious distinction between personhood as a sui gener-
is entity and personhood as an individual substance in the universe.51 
What a  Christian philosopher needs to do in this case is a  clarifica-
tion of the difference between human personhood sui generis and per-
sonhood as a cosmo-theologically determined individual. For this aim, 
a Christian philosopher needs to study the documents about the ori-
gins of this notion, analyze its historic development, and see the phil-
osophical distinction between “dignity” in a hierarchical universe, and 
Würde as inner value, as the basis of personal unity, non-reducibility, 
and irreplaceability.52
In this context, “demythologization” means above all the explo-
ration of the latent remnants of an earlier view of reality in our no-
tions today. Just as Alasdair MacIntyre offered a  clarification of the 
49 Thomas, Summa theologiae, op. cit., I, 30, 4.
50 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, transl. M. Gregor, Cambridge 1998, 
p. 42. It is important to see that the Latin “dignitas” and its derivations in contemporary languages 
do not properly express the notion of an “inner value” or “end itself ” as Kant defined them. Digni-
ty comes from the Latin “dignus” the meaning of which is “worthy of something,” “deserving some-
thing.” “Dignus” cannot articulate worth as an end in itself. “Dignitas” basically means merit, wor-
thiness (of something), hence authority, official rank, power. 
51 See R.  Spaemann, Persons: The Difference between ‘Someone’ and ‘Something’, Ox-
ford–New York 2006.
52 J. F. Crosby, Personalist Papers, Washington 2004, p. 26.
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fundamental notions of moral philosophy by referring to their Ar-
istotelian origin,53 we need to clarify the origins of our philosophi-
cal notions not only in individual authors of the past but rather in 
their general view of reality, in the structures of the cosmo-theological 
thinking, and in the concrete examples of the traces of such structures 
in the original meaning of these terms. On the other hand, it is not 
enough to return merely to these ancient authors in order to acquire 
a proper understanding of our philosophical terms; we need to see the 
development of the cosmo-theological structures in the philosophical 
context, the change of the meaning of the fundamental terms of phi-
losophy, the historical process of abstraction in which the cosmo-the-
ological character becomes blurred and, after a  certain time, hardly 
recognizable. This process of abstraction is crucial in maintaining the 
original character of our central notions, because we tend to believe 
that once a term is used in an abstract sense, its original meaning dis-
appears.54 The fact of the matter is different: the more abstract a notion 
becomes the more obstinately it maintains its connection, already la-
tent, to its original semantic environment. Demythologization is not 
only about a distinct period of the past, but about the semantic devel-
opment in which our notions slowly change their meaning and keep 
their origins in a concealed fashion.55
53 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue. A  Study in Moral Theory, University of Notre Dame 
Press 1984.
54 One of my favorite examples is Thomas’ description of contemplation as containing 
three movements: “These movements are of three kinds; for there is the ‘circular’ movement, by 
which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the ‘straight’ movement, by 
which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is ‘oblique,’ being imposed as it were of both 
the others” (Thomas, Summa theologiae, op. cit., II–II, 180, 6). The expressions applied here are of 
astronomical origin and point back, via Pseudo-Dionysius, to Aristotle. 
55 As an example, see the history of our alphabet. We still use letters which originate 
in proto-Phoenician signs which possessed a concrete meaning, such as bull (“aleph,” “a”), house 
(“beth,” “b”) or camel, stick (“gamil”, “g”) etc. Normally, we do not recognize that the system of signs 
we use to express our concepts in a written form points back to an ancient system of symbols; if we 
nevertheless realize this connection and study the emergence of modern Western alphabets, we un-
derstand more properly the system in which we express our notions and which is so different, for 
example, from the Chinese approach to conceive and express mental objects in a written form. 
136 Balázs M. Mezei
By determining of the main lines of the process of a philosophical 
demythologization, we still don’t know why a  philosopher, especially 
a Christian philosopher, should embark on such an obviously compli-
cated procedure. If philosophers avoid facing the fundamental character 
of the tradition of philosophy, they risk the danger of getting caught in 
a philosophical naïveté and lose the ability of understanding their dis-
cipline, its vocabulary and methodologies on a sufficient level of clarity. 
It is a commonplace to say that if we use a certain expression in a philo-
sophical sense, it is important to know its origins, its range of meaning, 
and its historical development. In a general sense the same can be said 
about the entire spectrum of philosophical terms, or even more of phi-
losophy itself as it evolved from its Greek origins.
Christian philosophers share this motive to understand their philo-
sophical tradition. However, they have additional reasons. It is a com-
mon characteristic of Christianity that fundamental historical events 
compelled its representatives to reinvestigate the meaning and role of 
their identity as Christian thinkers in the new context which emerged 
in the aftermath of such occurrences. One of the famous examples is 
Augustine’s City of God which was composed as a response to the sack 
of Rome in 410.56 The fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Lisbon earth-
quake in 1755 or the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nine-
teenth century offered new contexts in which Christianity, and especial-
ly Christian philosophy, had to redefine its meaning and character. It 
should be the subject of a specific study to explore the reactions to these 
and similar events in Christian thought; however, so much can already 
56 See, among other sources, the letters of Jerome, for instance CXXVIII: “The world 
sinks into ruin: yes! But shameful to say our sins still live and flourish. The renowned city, the capi-
tal of the Roman Empire, is swallowed up in one tremendous fire; and there is no part of the earth 
where Romans are not in exile. Churches once held sacred are now but heaps of dust and ashes; 
and yet we have our minds set on the desire of gain. We live as though we are going to die tomor-
row; yet we build as though we are going to live always in this world. Our walls shine with gold, 
our ceilings also and the capitals of our pillars; yet Christ dies before our doors naked and hun-
gry in the persons of His poor” (The letters of St. Jerome at: http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.
eu/03d/0347–0420,_Hieronymus,_Epistolae_%5BSchaff%5D,_EN.pdf [28.03.2013]).
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be seen that historical events of exceptional character did influence or 
even importantly determine the course of Christian reflection.57
The most important occurrence in this series of exceptional events, 
however, is what we refer to as “Auschwitz.” In Auschwitz, the Chosen 
People of the Holy Scriptures was sentenced to annihilation; and this 
event has a peculiar importance in a tradition the center of which has 
been precisely the relationship between “Jews” and “Christians.” As I ex-
plained it in detail in another work, Auschwitz is the most important 
motivation for a Christian philosopher to reexamine its philosophical 
tradition, its origins and developments, and to attempt to transcend the 
limits of this tradition. Auschwitz is a “watershed” not only in the con-
text of some centuries but with respect to the entire Christian tradi-
tion. For Auschwitz questioned not merely the millennia of Christian 
thought, but the very foundations of Christianity as well in which the 
role of the Chosen People had been considered crucial. Auschwitz in-
validates many of our earlier convictions and calls for a thoroughgoing 
reassessment. One result is what I term here the demythologization of 
philosophy, especially Christian philosophy — not with the purpose of 
“destruction” but with the purpose of a sufficient understanding of our 
tradition and opening a perspective, in which this tradition can be ex-
plored, understood, and properly assessed.58
The Christian philosopher is not without assistance in this task. 
First, we have the tradition of overall reassessments throughout the 
centuries. Second, in the tradition of Christian philosophy, the Tychon-
ic methodology has an important place. This methodology consists 
precisely in the attentive perception of “the signs of the times,” that 
is the perception of historicity as the most important layer in Chris-
tian thought. Thomas Aquinas reacted to the popularity of Aristotle’s 
57 Among the authors that are especially important in this respect we find Nicholas of 
Cusa, Leibniz, Goethe, Burke, and Schiller. 
58 See B. Mezei, Reason and Revelation…; also J. B. Metz, Memoria passionis. Ein pro-
vozierendes Gedächtnis in pluralistischer Gesellschaft, Freiburg–Basel–Wien 2006. Moreover Wres-
tling with God. Jewish Theological Responses during and after the Holocaust, eds. S. T. Katz, S. Bider-
man, G. Greenberg, Oxford 2007.
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writings with his universal synthesis. Ficino, Cusanus and other Re-
naissance philosophers responded to the fundamental changes in their 
time with broadening their perspectives in a radical way. Malebranche 
and other rationalistic philosophers used Cartesianism ingeniously 
and contributed to the modernization of Christian thought. We can 
witness similar changes in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with 
altering accents; the neo-realism and scientific awareness of the nine-
teenth century cannot be forgotten, just as the existential sensitivity 
of such thinkers as Gilson or von Balthasar in the twentieth century. 
And it is not merely the generally Tychonic characteristic which counts 
here; in the particular cases we observe, and can explore, sophisticated 
and well-informed attempts to understand tradition in the light of the 
new historical developments.
7. Fides et ratio
One of the most important documents of the application of a Tychon-
ic methodology in philosophy is the encyclical letter Fides et ratio by 
John Paul II. The letter should be seen in a historical context. As the sec-
ond papal document issued on the problem of philosophy, Fides et ratio 
continues the tradition laid down by the encyclical letter Aeterni patris 
of 1879 issued by Pope Leo XIII. At the same time, Fides et ratio char-
acteristically differs from some of the main features of its antecedent. 
Aeterni patris aspires to reach the restoration of Christian philosophy 
by turning the readers’ attention to the work of Thomas Aquinas. The 
main merit of the work of Thomas, according to Aeterni patris, is not 
its succinct character, its clarity, its systematic nature, but first of all its 
openness to the “physical sciences” which cannot “suffer detriment, but 
find very great assistance in the restoration of the ancient philosophy.”59 
Fides et ratio still considers the work of Thomas Aquinas crucial; yet it 
59 Encyclical letter Aeterni Patris of Pope Leo XIII On the Restoration of Christian Phi- 
losophy, 1879. See: www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_0408 
1879_aeterni-patris_en.html (§ 29).
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emphasizes a general openness to various philosophical approaches and 
systems, even Catholic philosophies of the nineteenth century which 
did not find approval in the time of Aeterni patris.60 Fides et ratio offers 
an encompassing analysis of the philosophical tradition and mentions 
its positive and negative developments; most importantly, it encourages 
philosophers to return to the original task of philosophy to rise to the 
horizon of metaphysics and ask “radical questions about the meaning 
and ultimate foundation of human, personal and social existence.” (§ 5) 
This encyclical combines the due respect for the richness of traditional 
philosophy with a call for “boldness” and “courage” to develop new ap-
proaches. The text often distinguishes negative and positive philosophy 
and urges its readers to refute atheism, nihilism, scientism, historicism; 
it advises us not to remain content “with partial and provisional truths” 
(§ 5), “with ancient myths” (§ 36), or “with more modest tasks such as 
the simple interpretation of facts or an enquiry into restricted fields of 
human knowing or its structures.” (§ 55) In other words, the general di-
rection of the encyclical clearly points to a new understanding of philos-
ophy which critically examines its past, continues its valuable insights 
and understandings, and becomes open to radically new approaches to 
philosophy. While Aeterni patris was about the restitution of philosophy 
on the basis of a tradition, Fides et ratio proposes a renewal with respect 
to the future: the renewal of Christian philosophy.
8. The Fundamental Structures  
of a Renewed Christian Philosophy
I want to emphasize the critical role of philosophy with respect to 
itself. It is especially Christian philosophy that, as demonstrated splen-
didly by Fides et ratio, is capable of realizing historical self-reflection, 
60 John Paul II, Pope: Encyclical Letter FIDES ET RATIO of the Supreme Pontiff John 




clarification, and openness to new developments. What I  term in this 
text the demythologizing of philosophy is indeed a corollary of the main 
conclusions of Fides et ratio.
To say that the task of demythologizing philosophy would lead to 
a kind of neglect or destruction of the traditional structures of philos-
ophy is contradictory in more than one sense. It is contradictory, be-
cause any destructive understanding of demythologization must be 
based on philosophical insights dependent on earlier philosophical de-
velopments; thus indistinctly refuting these developments equals to nul-
lifying the philosophical basis on which demythologizing would take 
place. Moreover, the above understanding is contradictory, because it 
does not give us the principles on the basis of which we are justified to 
reject the philosophical tradition as a whole. In contrast, the task of de-
mythologizing philosophy is to be understood as a result of the inner-
most developments of the philosophical tradition and thus it goes hand 
in hand with a  critical yet deep appreciation of these traditions. This 
task, moreover, is not for its own sake; it serves the understanding of the 
historical change in which we find ourselves in the context of philoso-
phy, especially Christian philosophy, and in which it becomes possible 
to build a more appropriate understanding of the human situation, its 
history and future perspectives. Demythologizing philosophy is in this 
sense a positive and edifying endeavor which is called to build, not to 
destroy. The mapping out of the semantic contents and philosophical 
consequences of the cosmo-theological view is anything else than just 
a one-sided criticism. The cosmo-theological criticism is actually a rad-
ical approach to the tradition of philosophy; it contains a series of rad-
ical questions we need to ask with respect to this tradition, its original 
semantic framework.
I believe that the field is sufficiently prepared for offering now a sum-
mary of the main features of a renewed Christian philosophy. I wish to 
consider this philosophy, the Christian philosophy for the twenty-first 
century, in three clusters: Methodology, Content, and Unity.
Methodology. The main method Christian philosophy needs to ap-
ply is historical criticism. Most importantly, a critical investigation is 
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needed of the cosmo-theological framework of ancient philosophical 
concepts, notions, and overall views of the universe, human beings, 
and societies. Concretely we have to analyze the relevant texts and 
other monuments, such as for example the mimema, the ancient plan-
etarium which is mentioned by many authors, including Plato. The 
investigation of the significance of findings such as the so-called An-
tikythera Mechanism is highly relevant here.61 This historical criticism 
aims at projecting the outlines and contents of the cosmo-theologi-
cal view with respect to the fundamental philosophical notions; for 
this endeavor we need to analyze positive evidences, such as astro-
nomical writings, and indirect evidences, such as the role of astrono-
my in scientific texts. Moreover, the nature of the cosmo-theological 
view makes it necessary to determine the symbolical and metaphor-
ical presence of cosmo-theology in philosophical texts. For instance, 
as Eva Brann demonstrated, the philosopher in Plato’s understanding 
shows a close resemblance to the mythical hero Hercules, a hero obvi-
ously possessing a cosmo-theological significance not only in his di-
vinization but already in the epic deeds he carried out. These deeds, 
just like the events in the myth of the Golden Fleece, have obvious as-
tronomical relevance.62
Christian philosophy inherited most of the philosophical vocabu-
lary and with it its cosmo-theological character. It is the task of histor-
ical criticism to determine the close connection between pre-Christian 
and Christian cosmo-theological views. In Christianity, the presence of 
cosmo-theology is evident in many writings, symbols, and cultural phe-
nomena; and the general effect of cosmo-theology can be verified far 
beyond the beginning of modernity. Christian philosophy uncritically 
received and applied many of such views; and in order to have a clear 
61 See http://www.antikythera-mechanism.com (29.03.2013). Moreover G.  Betegh, Le 
problème des représentations visuelles dans la cosmologie présocratique: pour une histoire de la mo-
délisation’, [in:] Qu’est-ce que la Philosophie Présocratique?/What is Presocratic Philosophy?, ed. 
A. Laks, C. Louget, Lille 2002, p. 381–415. 
62 E. T. H. Brann, The Music of the Republic: Essays on Socrates’ Conversations and Plato’s 
Writings, Philadelphia 2004.
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picture of the effects of this reception we cannot simply disregard some 
views of the ancient authors, embarrassing in the light of modern sci-
ence, and concentrate on an abstract interpretation of these authors. We 
need to see such views as constitutive in the works of these authors if 
we really want to understand them, their thinking, and the relevance 
of this thinking in our time. Thereby we become able to grasp the mar-
velous development Christian philosophy had gone through before the 
twentieth century: beginning with quite externalists understandings to 
the proper conception of crucial philosophical terms and contents, even 
theological contents.63
As mentioned, the most important motive behind the task of his-
torical criticism is history’s sudden changes, catastrophes, and break-
throughs. It is especially the role of a historical catastrophe which mer-
its particular attention, because it is verified that such catastrophes may 
lead to fundamental changes in our perception of reality. I repeat here 
that the catastrophe of “Auschwitz” offers indeed a new beginning for 
our reflections. It is by the trauma of Auschwitz that we perceive the 
need for an overall reassessment of our heritage, its contents, and its 
historical development. Without going into detail in this respect let me 
point out that Auschwitz in this sense may be seen as a direct conse-
quence of an uncritically received an applied cosmo-theology in which 
a proper perception of human personhood was not possible. We still live 
in the aftermath of this occurrence and have not yet assessed appropri-
ately its general significance and concrete consequences for the under-
standing of our traditions, present situation, and future.
The most important presupposition behind historical criticism 
is that history is a structured whole in which “change” has a number 
of well-defined meanings in the context of an overall and meaning-
ful modification of history. The meaningfulness of history cannot be 
denied, because otherwise the possibility of historical criticism is de-
nied as well. And if the meaningfulness of history is explored, then 
63 Needless to say that for instance the so important changes of the notion of person-
hood is relevant to important theological tenets as well.
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the importance of historical criticism can be defined as an opening of 
a meaningful perspective in the future of Christian philosophy. Wheth-
er we call this thinking “philosophy,” or apply a different name, is not 
relevant here; we need to see however, that philosophy as an encom-
passing, critical and future-oriented thinking, a sui generis activity of 
our human personhood, remains central to the understanding of his-
tory. In this sense, “Christian philosophy” is openness to the future, 
to a deeper understanding of our past, and to a perspective in which 
meaningfulness is the most important and overall framework of our 
personal activity. The traditional distinction between reason and faith 
remains valid, because human knowledge cannot but presuppose 
meaningfulness as an absolute given.64 Denying meaningfulness is con-
firming it. The human mind cannot produce meaningfulness in its gen-
eral sense and cannot be detached from it in the same sense; human 
knowledge is dependent on the fact of a meaningful history of the uni-
verse and mankind.
Contents. As to the contents of a demythologized Christian philos-
ophy, I already mentioned the importance of a revision of fundamental 
terms. Among innumerable examples let me mention again the impor-
tance of the notion of a person, because, in my understanding, person-
hood should be the center of a new Christian philosophy. The proper 
understanding of personhood must be contrasted with earlier views in 
which personhood was not yet grasped properly in its unity, irreplacea-
bility, and non-reducibility. The fundamental problem is not fully con-
ceived if we think that the non-genuine understanding of personhood 
consists in seeing the person as a substance in the world in line with the 
material substances of our external experience. Rather, the fundamen-
tal problem is that reality itself is seen commonsensically on the level of 
our external experience of material substances and so we easily fail to 
perceive the genuine nature of reality which is closer to personal exist-
ence than to the rigid material beings given in our external sensation. 
64 See B. Mezei, Faith and Reason (forthcoming in: Ayres, Lewis, ed., The Oxford Hand-
book for Catholic Theology, Oxford 2013).
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Personhood is a basic mode of existence and human beings are genuine 
embodiments of this basic mode. At the same time, personal existence 
is always existence in a community, and a community has an ultimate 
source in which the possibility of the community of human existence 
is organically rooted.65
It belongs to the perspective of the demythologizing of Christian 
philosophy that a new terminology is to be created. In the past, there 
have been several similar attempts, beginning with the first Alexandri-
an theologians through the creative genius of Pseudo-Dionysius in the 
sixth century or the Scholastic innovations in the Middle Ages up to 
the revolutionary changes in Catholic rationalism and romanticism. In 
the recent past, the works of Erich Przywara, Hans Urs von Balthasar 
or Karl Rahner are excellent examples of a philosophical and theologi-
cal renovation in which the vocabulary changes as well. In philosophy, 
we see many examples of such a partial or even extensive change of the 
vocabulary in the works of Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, 
Wittgenstein, or Lévinas. The reason for such a  change is always the 
perceived inability of earlier terms to express new insights properly. In 
my perspective of a demythologized Christian philosophy, the need for 
a  significant vocabulary change is perhaps even more urgent than in 
many other cases. “After Auschwitz” we do not only need to reassess our 
traditional ideas and expressions, but we have to attempt to create new 
expressions for our new understandings as well.
Unity. A demythologized Christian philosophy has to reassess the 
massive tradition of cosmo-theology in general philosophy as well as 
in Christian thought. Such a Christian thought recognizes history as its 
overall meaningful framework. History, however, is general and relative 
openness to the future. Christian philosophy needs to embody a gen-
eral and relative openness to the future too. It needs to have a general 
65 This understanding of reality can be interpreted as a philosophical corollary to the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory; in the present perspective, it is not centrally impor-
tant if one follows Heisenberg or Bohr in explaining the contents of this interpretation. On a more 
general level, see Lanza’s paper on biocentrism at: http://www.robertlanzabiocentrism.com/biocen-
trism-how-life-creates-the-universe/ (02.04.2013).
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openness, because its own history teaches it to endeavor fundamental 
changes at certain points; and it needs to have a relative openness, be-
cause Christian philosophy remains bound to the tradition precisely as 
the critical reassessment of this tradition. In this relative openness, we 
can focus on non-fundamental changes, such as those of Platonism in 
Augustine’s work, or fundamental changes, such as the consequences of 
Auschwitz. The relative openness of Christian philosophy is rooted in 
its general openness which can be described as its “Marian character.” 
As Fides et ratio points out, “philosophari in Maria” implies a funda-
mental faithfulness to the ultimate meaning of history. “Philosophari 
in Maria,” on the other hand, means a kind of thinking which points 
to the future with the clear recognition of the necessity of a general re-
newal of Christian thought.66
Most centrally, however, the general renewal of Christian philoso-
phy may explore the distinction I  mentioned at the beginning of my 
essay between “philosophia” and “philosophos.” Christian philosophy 
needs to be that of the “philosophos,” the “lover of the wise one,” and 
build a genuinely personal relationship between the intellectual work 
and its substantive basis, reality. In the perspective of historical criti-
cism, we cannot consider reality merely in terms of a cosmo-theologi-
cally determined objectivity, such as the one we still find in many vis-
tas of our sciences and philosophical reflections today. While earlier 
notions of objectivity and subjectivity were based on the perception of 
a closed universe, the notion of an open universe has in its core human 
personhood as openness: openness to reality in its entirety and open-
ness to history in its past, present and future dimensions. On the other 
hand, personal openness entails the openness of the universe, that is the 
66 In Prudence Allen’s article, we have a systematic approach to the notion of “philoso-
phari in Maria.” (http://www.secondspring.co.uk/articles/Mary%20and%20Philos%20by%20Pru-
dence%20Allen.pdf [29.03.2013]). Sister Prudence focuses on the main phases of Mary’s life and 
explains their significance one after the other from the philosophical point of view, always with ref-
erence to important theologians and philosophers. There is only one scene that is missing in her 
list: The Birth of the Savior. In my approach, “philosophari in Maria” has the central event of pre-
paring and accomplishing the birth of the fully other. 
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openness of reality as such. The changing structures of our universe, as 
we can now already see, correspond to the historical change in which 
human persons find themselves; and these forms of change are rooted 
in the fundamental openness of human personhood as the main feature 
of reality. Thus, in our perception, reality has a personal character in the 
sense of the personhood we possess today, and thus a personal relation-
ship between the Christian philosopher and its subject matter, reality, 
needs to be established. The Christian “philosophos” is called to open 
himself to “the wise one,” the meaningful framework of our existence, 
which cannot be derived from our efforts.67
67 An interesting theory of personal openness in an infinite future can be found in 
the works of the famous mathematician-priest of the nineteenth century, Bernard Bolzano of the 
Czech Lands. See especially his Athanasia; oder, Gründe für die Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Frankfurt 
am Main 1970. Bolzano held that the life of human persons on the Earth is only the beginning of 
a universal evolution at the end of which we find ourselves in the community of the blessed; human 
personhood on the Earth is openness to this development. In contemporary science, the “Goldi-
locks” or “anthropic” principle asserts that the universe is tailor-made for us, human beings. Fol-
lowing these investigations, we may overcome the cosmo-theological pattern not on the basis of 
one of its consequences (such as the aspect of rigid objectivity or an objectively conceived subjec-
tivity), but with respect to a new whole. 
